This article is from the American Review of International Arbitration (ARIA) Vol. 32 No. 1
© JurisNet, LLC 2021 www.arbitrationlaw.com

AFTER FIRST OPTIONS: DELEGATION RUN AMOK
George A. Bermann
I. INTRODUCTION
The proper allocation of authority between courts and arbitral tribunals over
the enforceability of agreements to arbitrate has long occupied a central place in
U.S. arbitration law, domestic and international alike. From U.S. Supreme Court
case law over the years, there has emerged a reasonably well-understood
distinction between those issues of enforceability that a court will address if asked
by a party to do so and those that it will not. Fundamental to the Court’s
jurisprudence is a recognition that some enforceability issues—“gateway
issues”—so seriously implicate the consent of parties to arbitrate their disputes
that a party contesting the enforceability of an arbitration agreement on those
grounds is entitled to a judicial determination of the matter, while others—“nongateway issues”—do not.1 The Supreme Court has adopted the convention of also
referring to gateway issues as issues of “arbitrability,” even though that is not how
the term arbitrability is understood throughout most of the world.2
Classic gateway issues include whether an agreement to arbitrate was ever
validly formed,3 whether a non-signatory is bound by it,4 and whether it
encompasses the dispute at hand.5 What these issues all have in common is the
perception that they directly implicate the consent of the parties to submit a
dispute to an arbitral rather than a judicial forum.6 By contrast, classic nongateway issues include the timeliness of requests to compel arbitration of a
dispute7 and the satisfaction, or not, of conditions precedent to arbitration.8 These
issues do not question the consent of the parties to arbitrate, but whether an
obligation to arbitrate a particular claim should be enforced. Parties are free to
See Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 587 U.S. ___ (2019), 139 S. Ct. 1407, 1415, 1419
(2019); Granite Rock Co. v. Int’l Brotherhood of Teamsters, 561 U.S. 287, 299 (2010);
Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. Animalfeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U. S., 662, 684 (2010);
Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 57 (1995); Volt Info. Scis.,
Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 479 (1989); Mitsubishi
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626 (1985).
2
The general understanding of arbitrability internationally is the legal capacity of a
category of claims to be arbitrated. See George A. Bermann, Arbitrability Trouble, 23 AM.
REV. INT’L ARB. 367, 369 (2012).
3
See, e.g., Painewebber v. Elahi, 87 F.3d 589 (1st Cir. 1996).
4
See, e.g., GE Energy Power Conversion Fr. SAS, Corp. v. Outokumpu Stainless
USA, LLC, 140 S.Ct. 1637 (2020).
5
See, e.g., Tracer Rsch. Corp. v. Nat’l Env’t Servs. Co., 42 F.3d 1292 (9th Cir. 1994).
6
See George A. Bermann, The “Gateway” Problem in International Commercial
Arbitration, 37 YALE J. INT'L L. 1 (2012).
7
See, e.g., Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 77 (2002).
8
See, e.g., BG Grp., PLC v. Republic of Argentina, 572 U.S. 25, 34 (2014).
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raise their arbitrability objections for the first time before an arbitral tribunal itself
for decision, but U.S. law also allows parties to raise them for the first time before a
court if they so prefer.
II. FIRST OPTIONS AND DELEGATION
Complicating the gateway/non-gateway distinction is the Supreme Court’s
recognition that parties are free, in an exercise of party autonomy, to reserve the
determination of gateway issues exclusively for arbitral determination, thereby
foregoing access to a court on those matters. In the Court’s terminology, parties
thereby “delegate” to a tribunal exclusive authority to determine issues over which
they would ordinarily be entitled to a judicial determination. In the leading
decision, First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, the Court unanimously
affirmed a ruling by the appeals court annulling an award rendered against a
married couple, the Kaplans, on the basis of that court’s independent finding that
only the couple’s wholly-owned company, not the couple themselves, were parties
to and bound by the agreement to arbitrate and were liable to payment of an award
rendered against them pursuant to that agreement.9 The Court there squarely
stated:
Courts should not assume that the parties agreed to arbitrate
arbitrability unless there is “clea[r] and unmistakabl[e]” evidence
that they did so. . . [T]he “who (primarily) should decide
arbitrability” question . . . is rather arcane. A party often might
not focus upon that question or upon the significance of having
arbitrators decide the scope of their own powers. And, given the
principle that a party can be forced to arbitrate only those issues it
specifically has agreed to submit to arbitration, one can
understand why courts might hesitate to interpret silence or
ambiguity on the “who should decide arbitrability“ point as
giving the arbitrators that power, for doing so might too often
force unwilling parties to arbitrate a matter they reasonably would
have thought a judge, not an arbitrator, would decide.10
The Supreme Court has thereafter reaffirmed on several occasions that “[t]he
question whether the parties have submitted a particular dispute to arbitration, i.e.,
the ‘question of arbitrability’ is ‘an issue for judicial determination [u]nless the
parties clearly and unmistakably provide otherwise.’”11
In sum, the Court in First Options took as its point of departure the conviction
that, due to the fundamental importance of consent to arbitrate, issues of
9

First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995).
Id. at 944-945 (citations omitted). The Court cited in support of this proposition its
prior rulings in AT & T Techs., Inc. v. Commc’ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 649
(1986); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior and Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U. S. 574,
583 n. 7 (1960).
11
See e.g., Howsam, 537 U.S. at 83. See also BG Grp., 572 U.S. at 34.
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arbitrability warrant independent judicial determination if sought. At the same
time, it left open the possibility that the parties, if they do so “clearly and
unmistakably,” could agree to forego access to a court on issues of arbitrability,
including whether the parties agreed to arbitrate, whether their agreement was
valid, whether a nonsignatory could invoke the agreement or be bound by it, and
whether the dispute at hand fell within the agreement’s scope of application.
In First Options, the Kaplans chose to challenge enforcement of the
arbitration agreement before the arbitral tribunal, rather than a court, as was their
privilege.12 Having failed to persuade the tribunal that they were not bound to
arbitrate, the Kaplans participated in the arbitration under protest, and lost.13 The
question whether they were bound to arbitrate came before a court only on a postaward basis, viz. in an action by the Kaplans to annul the resulting award.14
However, in most of the decided cases, the question whether a party ever agreed
to arbitrate is raised in the context of a motion to compel arbitration, i.e., prior to
arbitration getting underway.
III. KOMPETENZ-KOMPETENZ IN INSTITUTIONAL RULES
Central to First Options is the notion of “clear and unmistakable” evidence of
a delegation. In the great majority of delegation cases, respondents have argued
that, when parties adopt in their arbitration agreement a set of institutional rules
containing a Kompetenz-Kompetenz provision, they “clearly and unmistakably”
manifest an intention to “delegate” the determination of gateway issues to an
arbitral tribunal.15 According to the doctrine of Kompetenz-Kompetenz, an arbitral
tribunal has authority to determine its own jurisdiction.16
Every U.S. court of appeals to address the matter has taken the view that the
parties’ incorporation by reference in their arbitration agreement of procedural
rules containing a Kompetenz-Kompetenz provision clearly and unmistakably
signifies an intention on their part to vest exclusive authority over the arbitrability
of a dispute in an arbitral tribunal.17 However, no court of appeals has offered the
12

First Options, 514 U.S. at 941.
Id.
14
Id.
15
See Jack M. Graves & Yelena Davydan, Competence-Competence and
Separability-American Style, in INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL LAW: SYNERGY, CONVERGENCE AND EVOLUTION: LIBER AMICORUM ERIC
BERGSTEN 157, 162 n.35 (Stefan Kröll et al. eds., 2011) (citing Joseph L. Franco, Casually
Finding the Clear and Unmistakable: A Re-Evaluation of First Options in Light of Recent
Lower Court Decisions, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 442, 469-70 (2006)).
16
See generally, C. Ryan Reetz, The Limits of the Competence-Competence Doctrine
in United States Courts, 5 DISP. RESOL. INT'L 5 (2011).
17
See Blanton v. Domino’s Pizza Franchising LLC, 962 F.3d 842, 846 (6th Cir. 2020)
(“Finally, consider that every one of our sister circuits to address the question—eleven out
of twelve by our count—has found that the incorporation of the AAA Rules (or similarly
worded arbitral rules) provides ‘clear and unmistakable’ evidence that the parties agreed to
arbitrate ‘arbitrability.’ [. . .] And the one remaining circuit has precedent suggesting that
13
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slightest reasoning in support of that position, as typified by the early Eighth
Circuit ruling in FSC Sec. Corp. v. Freel, in which the court had only this to say:
[T]he parties expressly agreed to have their dispute governed by
the NASD Code of Arbitration Procedure. . . . [W]e hold that the
parties’ adoption of this provision is a ‘clear and unmistakable’
expression of their intent to leave the question of arbitrability to
the arbitrators.18
Other courts of appeals have decided the matter in a similarly perfunctory
fashion.19 They all make the same unexplained assumption that, if arbitrators
have authority to determine arbitral jurisdiction, then the courts necessarily do not.
Worse yet, the majority of court of appeals decisions that followed do not even
purport to address the issue, but instead simply “join” the views that other courts
of appeal had previously taken. For example, the Fifth Circuit in Petrofac, Inc. v.
DynMcDermott Petroleum Operations Co. confined itself to the following: “We
agree with most of our sister circuits that the express adoption of these rules
presents clear and unmistakable evidence that the parties agreed to arbitrate
arbitrability.”20 Notwithstanding the high stakes associated with delegations of
authority to determine arbitrability, the courts of appeals have failed to give them
any serious consideration.
it would join this consensus.”) (citing Awuah v. Coverall N. Am., Inc., 554 F.3d 7, 11–12
(1st Cir. 2009); Contec Corp. v. Remote Sol., Co., 398 F.3d 205, 208–09 (2d Cir. 2005);
Richardson v. Coverall N. Am., Inc., — F. App’x —, 2020 WL 2028523, at *2–3 (3d Cir.
2020); Simply Wireless, Inc v. TMobile US, Inc, 877 F.3d 522, 527–28 (4th Cir. 2017)
(same for the “substantively identical” JAMS Rules), abrogated on other grounds by
Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer & White Sales, Inc. 139 S. Ct. 524; Petrofac, Inc. v.
DynMcDermott Petrol. Operations Co., 687 F.3d 671, 675 (5th Cir. 2012); Fallo v. HighTech, 559 F.3d 874, 878 (8th Cir. 2009); Brennan v. Opus Bank, 796 F.3d 1125, 1130–31
(9th Cir. 2015); Dish Network L.L.C. v. Ray, 900 F.3d 1240, 1246 (10th Cir. 2018);
Terminix Int’l Co., LP v. Palmer Ranch Ltd. P’ship, 432 F.3d 1327, 1332 (11th Cir. 2005);
Qualcomm Inc. v. Nokia Corp., 466 F.3d 1366, 1372–73 (Fed. Cir. 2006), abrogated on
other grounds by Henry Schein, 139 S. Ct. 524; Chevron Corp. v. Ecuador, 795 F.3d 200,
207–08 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (same for the United Nations Commission on International Trade
Law Rules); Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 541 F.2d 1263, 1272–73 (7th
Cir. 1976) (relying on the incorporation of the AAA Rules to find that the parties had
agreed to binding arbitration).)
18
FSC Sec. Corp. v. Freel, 14 F.3d 1310, 1312-13 (8th Cir. 1994).
19
See, e.g., Oracle Am., Inc. v. Myriad Grp. A.G., 724 F.3d 1069, 1074–75 (9th Cir.
2013) (“We see no reason to deviate from the prevailing view that incorporation of the
UNCITRAL arbitration rules is clear and unmistakable evidence that the parties agreed the
arbitrator would decide arbitrability”); Qualcomm Inc. v. Nokia Corp., 466 F.3d 1366 (Fed.
Cir. 2006) (“We agree with the Second Circuit’s analysis …and likewise conclude that the
2001 Agreement, which incorporates the AAA Rules . . . clearly and unmistakably shows the
parties’ intent to delegate the issue of determining arbitrability to an arbitrator.”).
20
Petrofac, Inc. v. DynMcDermott Petrol. Operations Co., 687 F.3d 671, 675 (5th Cir.
2012.)
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For reasons set out below, the position taken by the courts of appeals in these
cases is fundamentally misguided. First, the way to make a delegation clear and
unmistakable is not to bury it in appended rules of arbitral procedure, but rather to
state it plainly in the arbitration agreement itself. Second, even if incorporation by
reference were a sufficient delegation vehicle, the language of the KompetenzKompetenz provisions in these cases fails to support an inference that if tribunals
may determine their arbitral jurisdiction, courts by definition may not. Third, it is
well established that Kompetenz-Kompetenz in U.S. law signifies only that
tribunals may determine their authority; it does not make that authority exclusive.
Fourth, treating a standard Kompetenz-Kompetenz clause as sufficient to establish
clear and unmistakable evidence of a delegation effectively reverses First Options’
strong presumption that parties are entitled to an independent judicial
determination of arbitrability if that is what they seek.
IV. SCHEIN, INC. V. ARCHER & WHITE SALES, INC.
The question whether the incorporation by reference of institutional rules
containing a Kompetenz-Kompetenz provision constitutes clear and unmistakable
evidence, within the meaning of First Options, first drew the Court’s attention in
the case of Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer and White Sales, Inc. The issue before the
Court there was not whether a Kompetenz-Kompetenz provision in a set of
incorporated rules constitutes clear and unmistakable evidence of a delegation, but
rather whether, assuming a valid delegation has been made, a court could avoid
referring the case to arbitration on the ground that the particular challenge to
arbitrability being advanced was “wholly groundless.”21 The Court in Schein ruled
unanimously that no such “wholly groundless” exception exists.22
However, during oral argument in Schein, several members of the Court
expressed doubt whether the incorporation of institutional rules containing a
Kompetenz-Kompetenz clause did in itself amount to a delegation within the
meaning of First Options in the first place. The arbitration clause in Schein had
stated: “Any dispute arising under or related to this Agreement (except for actions
seeking injunctive relief and disputes related to . . . intellectual property of Pelton
& Crane), shall be resolved by binding arbitration in accordance with the
arbitration rules of the American Arbitration Association.”23 This clause contained
no language whatsoever suggestive of a delegation.
At the very outset of oral argument, Justice Ginsburg queried counsel as to
why the above-quoted arbitration agreement divested courts of authority to
determine arbitrability:
But clear—clear and unmistakable delegation, why can’t it be
both; that is, that the arbitrator has this authority to decide questions
21

Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer and White Sales, Inc., 576 U.S. ___, 139 S. Ct. 524,
527-28 (2019).
22
Id.
23
Id. at 528.
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of arbitrability, but it is not exclusive of the court? We have one
brief saying that that is indeed the position that the Restatement
has taken.
....
When . . . the model case is this Court’s [Rent-A-Center] decision,
and there the—the clause said the arbitrator, not the court, has
exclusive authority. And here we—we’re missing both the
arbitrator, to the exclusion of the court, and the arbitrator has
exclusive authority.24
Similarly, Justice Kagan inquired:
First Options is a case where we said we’re not going to treat
these delegation clauses in exactly the same way as we treat other
clauses. And there was an idea that people don’t really think
about the question of who decides, and so we’re going to hold
parties to this higher standard, the clear and unmistakable intent
standard.25
Justice Breyer observed:
[S]o you say step 1. Is there clear and unmistakable evidence that
an arbitrator is to decide whether a particular matter X is
arbitrable? Is that right?
....
Step 1 is we have to decide . . . whether there is a clear and
unmistakable commitment to have this kind of matter decided in
arbitration.26
Justice Gorsuch in turn asked: “[T]here’s just maybe a really good argument that
clear and unmistakable proof doesn’t exist in this case of—of a desire to go to
arbitration and have the arbitrator decide arbitrability?”27
Significantly, in its directions on remand in Schein, the Court specifically
invited the Fifth Circuit to address the question whether First Options’ clear and
unmistakable evidence requirement had been met:
We express no view about whether the contract at issue in this
case in fact delegated the arbitrability question to an arbitrator.
The Court of Appeals did not decide that issue. Under our cases,
courts ‘should not assume that the parties agreed to arbitrate
arbitrability unless there is clear and unmistakable evidence that
24
Transcript of Oral Argument at 7, 18, Schein, 139 S. Ct. 524 (2019) (No. 17-1272)
[hereinafter O.A. Tr.].
25
Id. at 17.
26
Id. at 20, 24.
27
Id. at 42.

2021]

AFTER FIRST OPTIONS: DELEGATION RUN AMOK

21

they did so.’ On remand, the Court of Appeals may address that
issue in the first instance. . . . 28
It is a sign of the importance of this predicate question that members of the Court
raised the issue, despite not having granted certiorari on it and the parties not
having focused on it in their briefs.
However, the Fifth Circuit failed on remand to make the determination that
the Court requested. Instead, it simply followed its prior decision in Petrofac, Inc.
v. DynMcDermott Petroleum Operations Co. to the effect that “an arbitration
agreement that incorporates the AAA Rules ‘presents clear and unmistakable
evidence that the parties agreed to arbitrate arbitrability.’”29 The court then
declined to refer the parties to arbitration on the ground that the claim being
brought fell within a “carve-out” to the arbitration agreement.30 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari on the “carve-out” question while denying a cross-motion
or grant of certiorari on the question whether the parties had made a sufficiently
clear and unmistakable delegation. It then heard oral argument, but subsequently
dismissed the case on the ground that certiorari had been improvidently granted.31
The Court therefore ultimately addressed neither the “carve-out” nor the
delegation question.32
V. INCORPORATION BY REFERENCE
It is questionable at the very outset that evidence of a delegation should be
considered clear and unmistakable when it is relegated to a separate instrument
that is only incorporated by reference in an agreement to arbitrate, rather than set
out in an arbitration agreement itself. By definition, a provision as consequential
as a delegation of authority to determine gateway issues cannot be deemed clear
and unmistakable when it is buried in a referenced set of procedural rules. Parties
can reasonably be expected to read a contractual arbitration clause carefully
before agreeing to it. An arbitration clause is where a party entertaining any
doubts over whether it was jeopardizing its right of access to a court on the
question whether it consented to arbitrate would likely look. But, a party cannot
realistically be expected to scrutinize lengthy and detailed rules of arbitral
procedure incorporated by reference in an arbitration clause in search of
28

Schein, 139 S. Ct. at 531 (citations omitted).
Archer and White Sales, Inc. v. Henry Schein, Inc., 935 F.3d 274, 279 (5th Cir.
2019) (citing Petrofac, Inc. v. DynMcDermott Petrol. Operations Co., 687 F.3d 671, 675
(5th Cir. 2012)).
30
Archer and White Sales, 935 F.3d at 281-82.
31
Writ of Certiorari, Schein, 141 S.Ct. 107 (2021) (No. 19-963) (per curiam). See also
Brief for Petitioner, Schein, No. 19-963, 2020 WL 5074342, at *14-15 (5th Cir. Aug.,
2020).
32
The Supreme Court also denied certiorari in another case, raising directly the
question whether a Kompetenz-Kompetenz clause in incorporated rules of procedure
constitutes a clear and unmistakable indication of an intention to make a delegation.
Denial of Writ of Certiorari, Piersing v. Domino’s Pizza, No. 20-695 (U.S. Jan. 25, 2021).
29
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enlightenment on that matter. Practically speaking, for most parties, rules of
arbitral procedure assume importance only once arbitration is initiated. Why, more
particularly, would a party look to an instrument outside the arbitration agreement
and denominated rules of arbitral procedure to find principles that address the
relationship between arbitral and judicial jurisdiction, which is not a procedural
matter?
In the only case in which the Supreme Court had squarely faced a delegation
clause—Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson—the parties did what anyone intent
on making evidence of a delegation clear and unmistakable would do.33 They
made the delegation directly in their arbitration agreement itself.34 No party
seeking to make a delegation genuinely conspicuous would choose to place it
anywhere else, including in a set of referenced procedural rules.
But, even if incorporation by reference were good enough, which it is not, the
presence of a Kompetenz-Kompetenz clause in a set of incorporated rules in itself,
as shown in the sections that follow, falls far short of clearly and unmistakably
manifesting an intention to delegate, and for several reasons.
VI. THE MEANING OF KOMPETENZ-KOMPETENZ
A Kompetenz-Kompetenz clause unquestionably vests authority in an arbitral
tribunal to determine its own jurisdiction.35 The relevant procedural rule in the
Schein case—Rule 7 of the AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules—states directly
as follows: “The arbitrator shall have the power to rule on his or her own
jurisdiction, including any objections with respect to the existence, scope, or
validity of the arbitration agreement(s) or to the arbitrability of any claim or
counterclaim.”37 By its plain meaning, Rule 7 gives tribunals authority that they
arguably would not otherwise have. This is significant. Absent such a provision, a
tribunal whose jurisdiction is challenged on arbitrability grounds could be stopped
in its tracks if and when a party challenging arbitrability has recourse to a court
for a determination of the matter. The tribunal would likely suspend proceedings
pending a judicial determination, resulting in delay and expense, thereby
compromising two of arbitration’s strongest selling points: speed and economy.
Conferring authority on a tribunal to determine its own competence is thus neither
negligible nor to be taken for granted. It contributes importantly to arbitration’s
efficacy as a dispute resolution mechanism.
But it does not follow from the fact that arbitrators have authority to
determine arbitrability that courts do not. In order for Kompetenz-Kompetenz to
achieve its important purpose, it need not be understood as divesting courts of
authority to make that jurisdictional determination if asked to do so. In order to
reach the result it did in the Schein case, the Fifth Circuit, like the courts of
33

Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63 (2010).
Id. at 66.
35
GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 1141 (3d ed. 2021).
37
Am. Arb. Ass’n (AAA), Commercial Arbitration Rules R-7 (Oct. 1, 2013).
34
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appeals in the other cases, was required to read into the Kompetenz-Kompetenz
clause in the AAA Rules the word “exclusive” which is not there.38 That is a big
and very serious leap, and by no means a necessary one, as the above-cited
remarks by members of the Supreme Court at the oral argument in Schein reveal.
The way in which parties properly dispel doubt over whether they have
delegated to a tribunal sole authority to determine matters of arbitrability is
through the simple device of making arbitral authority over gateway issues
expressly exclusive. That is precisely what the parties did in the Rent-A-Center
case. Their arbitration agreement stated:
[t]he Arbitrator, and not any federal, state, or local court or
agency, shall have exclusive authority to resolve any dispute
relating to the interpretation, applicability, enforceability or
formation of this [Arbitration] Agreement including, but not
limited to any claim that all or any part of this [Arbitration]
Agreement is void or voidable.39
In other words, the parties in Rent-A-Center took two simple steps to make their
intent to delegate authority to determine arbitrability clear and unmistakable. As
already noted,40 they placed the delegation clause in the arbitration agreement
itself, not in rules incorporated by reference—and they expressly declared that
authority to be “exclusive.” That is why the question whether there was a valid
delegation in Rent-A-Center was never even raised.
Certain lower federal courts, both before and after the trend among the courts
of appeal had emerged, have properly understood the difference between granting
authority to tribunals and depriving courts of that authority, and could not bring
themselves to describe reference to Kompetenz-Kompetenz in incorporated
procedural rules as clear and unmistakable evidence of a delegation. One federal
district court, in a circuit that has not yet ruled on the issue, bucked the trend
among the courts of appeals:
It is hard to see how an agreement’s bare incorporation by
reference of a completely separate set of rules that includes a
statement that an arbitrator has authority to decide validity and
arbitrability amounts to “clear and unmistakable” evidence that
the contracting parties agreed to . . . preclude a court from
answering them. To the contrary, that seems anything but ‘clear.’
And the AAA rule itself does not make the purported delegation
of authority any more “clear” or “unmistakable.” The AAA rule
simply says that the arbitrator has the authority to decide these
questions. It does not say that the arbitrator has the sole authority,
the exclusive authority, or anything like that. The language of the
38

Archer and White Sales, Inc. v. Henry Schein, Inc., 935 F.3d 274, 280 (5th Cir. 2019).
Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 66 (2010) (emphasis added).
40
See Denial of Writ of Certiorari, Piersing v. Domino’s Pizza, No. 20-695 (U.S. Jan.
25, 2021) and text accompanying note 24.
39

24

THE AMERICAN REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION

[Vol. 32

rule does not suggest a delegation of authority; at most it
indicates that the arbitrator possesses authority, which is not the
same as an agreement by the parties to give him sole authority to
decide those issues.41
Another federal district court felt obliged to follow the prevailing view, but
not without strongly condemning it as “incongruous,” “ridiculous” and “bordering
on the absurd.”42 It added: “[h]ow this could be considered clear and unmistakable
can only be explained if the true meaning of ‘clear’ and ‘unmistakable’ are [sic]
ignored.”43 The court nevertheless felt obliged to follow the trend.44
The meaning of First Options also arises regularly in state courts since the
FAA does not create federal subject-matter jurisdiction, much less exclusive
jurisdiction. Some of these courts, like certain federal district courts, have rightly
rejected the facile assumption that a grant to arbitrators of authority to determine
arbitrability necessarily divests courts of that authority. A Florida appellate court
recently stated:
[W]e find something missing. This [institutional] rule confers an
adjudicative power upon the arbitrator, but it does not purport to
make that power exclusive. Nor does it purport to contractually
remove that adjudicative power from a court of competent
jurisdiction.
....
We respectfully disagree with [holdings finding otherwise]
because we do not believe they comport with what First Options
requires . . . . [N]one of these cases have ever examined how or
why the mere “incorporation” of an arbitration rule such as the
one before us . . . satisfies the heightened standard the Supreme
Court set in First Options, nor how it overcomes the “strong procourt presumption” that is supposed to attend this inquiry. Most
of the opinions have simply stated the proposition as having been
established with citations to prior decisions that did the same.45
Because the Florida state courts are divided, the Florida Supreme Court is hearing
the case and, as of this writing, oral argument awaits.46 The Florida courts are not

41

Taylor v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., No. 19 C 4526, 2020 WL 1248655, at *4 (N.D.
Ill. Mar. 16, 2020).
42
Ashworth v. Five Guys Operations, LLC, No. 3:16-06646, 2016 WL 7422679, at *3
(S.D. W.Va. Dec. 22, 2016).
43
Id.
44
Id.
45
Doe v. Natt, No. 2D19-1383, 2020 WL 1486926, at *7-9 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Mar.
25, 2020) (citations omitted).
46
Airbnb, Inc. v. John Doe, et al., Case No. SC2020-1167 (Fla. Filed Mar. 2, 2021).
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alone.47 The matter is also pending before the Texas Supreme Court, since lower
state courts in Texas as well are divided over the issue.48
The only reason any U.S. court of appeals has advanced in support of its
position that a Kompetenz-Kompetenz provision in incorporated procedural rules
constitutes clear and unmistakable evidence of a delegation is that the AAA, the
institution whose rules were invoked in that case, had amended the language of
the rules precisely in order to meet the First Options clear and unmistakable
evidence test.49 That may well be the case, but is of little import. It does not matter
what the AAA thought it was doing. What matters is what parties signing an
arbitration agreement think they are doing. That the AAA thinks its amended
clause constitutes clear and unmistakable evidence does not mean that it does. It
does not.
VII. KOMPETENZ-KOMPETENZ IN U.S. LAW
In fact, Kompetenz-Kompetenz has been consistently understood in the U.S. to
authorize an arbitral tribunal to determine its jurisdiction if challenged, and
nothing more.50 In point of fact, there has never been any inconsistency in U.S.
law between Kompetenz-Kompetenz, on the one hand, and access to a court on
issues of arbitrability, on the other. Decades before arbitral institutions were
47

See Ajamian v. CantorCO2e, L.P., 137 Cal. Rptr. 3d 773, 782-83 (Cal. Ct. App.
2012) (citations omitted):
The “clear and unmistakable” test reflects a “heightened standard” of
proof. That is because the question of who would decide the
unconscionability of an arbitration provision is not one that the parties
would likely focus upon in contracting, and the default expectancy is
that the court would decide the matter. Thus . . . a contract’s silence or
ambiguity about the arbitrator’s power in this regard cannot satisfy the
clear and unmistakable evidence standard.
....
Appellants . . . point[] primarily to . . . the arbitration provision[’s] . . .
proviso that arbitration may be conducted according to the rules of the
AAA (under which an arbitrator has the power to determine the validity
of an arbitration agreement). [Appellee] disagrees with appellants’
arguments . . . [Appellee]—and the trial court—have it right.
48
Totalenergies E&P USA, Inc. v. MP Gulf of Mexico, LLC, No. 21-0028 (Tex. filed
Apr. 2, 2021).
49
Blanton v. Domino’s Pizza Franchising LLC, 962 F.3d 842, 8495050 (6th Cir.
2020).
50
Ashley Cook, Kompetenz-Kompetenz: Varying Approaches and a Proposal for a
Limited Form of Negative Kompetenz-Kompetenz, 2014 PEPP. L. REV. 17, 25 (2014)
(explaining that U.S. law does not “even contemplate[e] negative kompetenzkompetenz”); William Park, Challenging Arbitral Jurisdiction: The Role of Institutional
Rules 16, (Bos. Univ. Sch. of L., Pub. L. & Legal Theory Paper No. 15-40, 2015)
(“[C]ourts will provide early decisions on the validity of a dispute resolution clause
alleged to be void ab initio because, for instance, the person signing the contract lacked
authority to commit the company sought to be bound.”).
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putting Kompetenz-Kompetenz provisions in their procedural rules, courts and
tribunals were already practicing Kompetenz-Kompetenz, without any supposition
that it barred courts from making an independent judicial determination of
arbitrability prior to arbitration if so requested.51
The fact that Kompetenz-Kompetenz does not preclude access to a court on
arbitrability issues is actually built into the key instruments of domestic and
international arbitration law in the U.S. The Federal Arbitration Act specifically
calls upon courts to compel arbitration only if they are “satisfied that the making
of the agreement for arbitration . . . [was] not in issue.”52 Similarly, under Article
II of the New York Convention, courts do not refer parties to arbitration if they
find the arbitration agreement to be “null and void, inoperative or incapable of
being performed.”53 Courts could not possibly perform their obligations under the
FAA or the New York Convention if Kompetenz-Kompetenz operated to negate
judicial authority to make arbitrability determinations. In sum, the KompetenzKompetenz principle in U.S. law has never entailed the corollary that, if arbitrators
may decide arbitrability, courts may not.
The understanding of Kompetenz-Kompetenz in U.S. law contrasts sharply
with the understanding that prevails in certain other countries, which view the
doctrine as both vesting tribunals with authority to determine arbitrability and
divesting courts of that authority. The jurisdiction that most resolutely adheres to
this approach (but not the only one to adopt it) is France. Under settled French
law, Kompetenz-Kompetenz has both a “positive” and a “negative” dimension.54
The former affirmatively confers on tribunals authority to determine their
jurisdiction, while the latter deprives courts, prior to arbitration, of that authority.55
Significantly, however, even under French law, negative Kompetenz-Kompetenz is
not entirely unreviewable. The Civil Procedure Code expressly authorizes courts
to decline to enforce an arbitration agreement if they find it “manifestly void or
manifestly not applicable.”56 The sharp difference between the U.S. version
of Kompetenz-Kompetenz (“positive” only) and the French version (both
“positive” and “negative”) pervades the international arbitration literature. The
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See generally James Crawford, Continuity and Discontinuity in International
Dispute Settlement: An Inaugural Lecture, 1 J. INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 3, 15-20 (2010).
52
Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 4 (emphasis added).
53
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards art.
II(3), June 10, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 (emphasis added). See also Federal
Arbitration Act § 201.
54
See generally Emmanuel Gaillard & Yas Banifatemi, Negative Effect of CompetenceCompetence: The Rule of Priority in Favor of the Arbitrators, in ENFORCEMENT OF
ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS AND INTERNATIONAL ARBITRAL AWARDS: THE NEW YORK
CONVENTION IN PRACTICE 257 (Emmanuel Gaillard & Domenico Di Pietro eds., 2008).
55
BORN, supra note 35, at 1161.
56
Code De Procédure Civile [C.P.C.] [Civil Procedure Code] art. 1448 (Fr.).
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fact that Kompetenz-Kompetenz in U.S. law has only a positive dimension is
simply uncontested.57
In short, whether incorporated in institutional rules or not, KompetenzKompetenz, as indisputably understood in U.S. law, does not deprive courts of the
authority, when asked, to determine the arbitrability of a dispute prior to arbitration
—much less deprive them of that authority “clearly and unmistakably.” There is no
justification for altering the established meaning of Kompetenz-Kompetenz merely
because it has made its way into a set of incorporated procedural rules.
VIII. A REVERSAL OF PRESUMPTIONS
The Supreme Court in First Options deliberately made judicial authority to
determine arbitrability the rule, and deprivation of that authority the exception,
doing so out of a commitment to the principle of party consent lying at the heart of
U.S. arbitration law. By its own account, the Court in that decision prescribed a
“heightened standard” for finding a delegation.58 In a word, parties must decidedly
“go out of their way” to withdraw from courts the authority to decide issues of
arbitrability that they ordinarily enjoy. The “clear and unmistakable” standard
cannot be understood any other way.
The Supreme Court’s purpose in First Options would be frustrated if the mere
inclusion of a Kompetenz-Kompetenz clause in procedural rules referenced in an
arbitration agreement were treated, per se, as clear and unmistakable evidence of a
delegation. There is nothing in the language of a standard garden-variety
Kompetenz-Kompetenz clause, wherever it may be found, that puts a party on
sufficient notice of a delegation. A party reading that language would have no idea
that, by signing the agreement, it was relinquishing its fundamental right of access
to a court to demonstrate that it never consented to arbitration, i.e., that the
agreement was never formed, is not binding on it, is invalid or has no application
to the dispute. As the Court stated in First Options itself, treating as a valid
delegation a clause that is less than clear and unmistakable “might too often force
unwilling parties to arbitrate a matter they reasonably would have thought a judge,
not an arbitrator, would decide.”59 The Court considered Kompetenz-Kompetenz
far too “arcane” to be given that effect.60
The inescapable conclusion from all that precedes is that a KompetenzKompetenz provision, wherever placed, is altogether too oblique a means of
informing parties of a matter as momentous as loss of the right of access to a court
on matters of arbitrability—a right of access that they have every reason to believe
they enjoy. It is worth recalling here the concern voiced by Justice Kagan in Schein:
57

See, e.g., Jack M. Graves & Yelena Davydan, Competence-Competence and
Separability-American Style, in INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL LAW: SYNERGY, CONVERGENCE AND EVOLUTION: LIBER AMICORUM ERIC
BERGSTEN 157 (Stefan Kröll et al. eds., 2011).
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Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 69 n.1 (2010).
59
First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 945 (1995).
60
Id.
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[I]f you look at First Options, First Options is a case where we
said we’re not going to treat these delegation clauses in exactly
the same way as we treat other clauses. And there was an idea that
people don’t really think about the question of who decides, and
so we’re going to hold parties to this higher standard, the clear
and unmistakable intent standard.61
Moreover, today Kompetenz-Kompetenz provisions are ubiquitous. They are
found in virtually every modern set of institutional rules; the AAA Rules are by no
means exceptional.62 They are also found in virtually every modern arbitration law
that States enact to regulate international arbitral activity conducted on their
territory. Under the leading model law of international arbitration, widely adopted
around the world and even by a good number of U.S. states: “[t]he arbitral tribunal
may rule on its own jurisdiction, including any objections with respect to the
existence or validity of the arbitration agreement.”63 It is consequently the rare
international arbitration indeed that is conducted in the absence of a KompetenzKompetenz provision. In other words, such provisions have become, for all
practical purposes, “boiler-plate.” Parties do not need to “go out of their way” to
subject their arbitrations to Kompetenz-Kompetenz. All modern arbitration laws
and rules do that for them.
In short, treating a standard Kompetenz-Kompetenz provision as per se clear and
unmistakable evidence within the meaning of First Options effectively reverses the
presumption that the Supreme Court so emphatically established in that case when it
decided in favor of a party’s right of access to a court on the basic issue of consent
to arbitrate. It comports neither with the letter nor the spirit of First Options to treat
a Kompetenz-Kompetenz provision in a set of incorporated institutional rules as
clear and unmistakable evidence of an intention to deprive parties of access to an
independent judicial determination of arbitrability. This simply cannot be the result
that the Supreme Court had in mind in rendering the First Options decision.
IX. THE EFFECT OF A DELEGATION ON A POST-AWARD ACTION
The cases just discussed all concern the delegation issue as it arises prior to
arbitration, i.e., when a court is asked to compel arbitration. But the delegation
issue also arises in a post-award action (as it did in the First Options case itself),
and there too it has enormously important consequences. More particularly, it
would be a great mistake to assume that, if U.S. courts lose their authority to
ensure the arbitrability of a dispute prior to arbitration, they will recover it at the
end of the process. Under U.S. law, once a proper delegation is made, courts are
61

O.A. Tr., supra note 24, at 17.
Thus, Article 23(1) of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (2013) similarly provides
that “[t]he arbitral tribunal shall have the power to rule on its own jurisdiction, including
any objections with respect to the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement.”
63
UN Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law (UNCITRAL), Model Law on International
Commercial Arbitration, art. 16(1) (2006).
62
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sidelined, not only pre-arbitration but also in post-award review.64 The case law
holds that, under a proper delegation, courts also cannot, in a vacatur or
confirmation action, meaningfully ensure that the award debtor consented to
arbitration; they owe extreme deference to a tribunal’s determination whether an
arbitration agreement exists, is valid, is applicable to a non-signatory and
encompasses the dispute at hand.65 According to the American Law Institute’s
Restatement of the U.S. Law of International Commercial and Investor-State
Arbitration, under a delegation, in order to be overturned, a tribunal’s finding of
arbitrability must be “baseless,”66 resting this conclusion on the Supreme Court’s
ruling in the case of Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter.67
Thus, under a delegation, at no point in the arbitration life cycle will parties
have the benefit of an independent judicial determination whether they indeed
consented to arbitrate. This is too drastic a result to follow from the mere presence
of a standard Kompetenz-Kompetenz provision only found in the rules of
procedure incorporated by reference in an agreement to arbitrate and again, cannot
possibly be what the Supreme Court intended in First Options when it demanded
clear and unmistakable evidence of a delegation.
A comparison with French law in this regard is here too highly illuminating.
As noted, under French law, courts have virtually no role in ensuring that a
dispute is arbitrable before compelling parties to arbitrate.68 For all practical
purposes, a dispute will proceed to arbitration on the merits if a tribunal, in its
exercise of Kompetenz-Kompetenz, finds a dispute to be arbitrable. The
involvement of a court at this stage is negligible.
However, French law justifies this result precisely on the ground that after an
arbitration comes to a close and an award is rendered, a party that failed to
convince the tribunal to dismiss a case on arbitrability grounds has access to a
court to have the resulting award annulled or denied enforcement on those same
grounds. Moreover, the inquiry into arbitrability that a French court performs on
that occasion is not deferential, but completely de novo.69 In other words, French
courts fully regain at the end of the process the role they were denied at the outset.
Under a delegation clause, U.S. courts do not.
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See Schneider v. Kingdom of Thailand, 688 F.3d 68, 74 (2d Cir. 2012) (“Because
Walter Bau and Thailand clearly and unmistakably agreed to arbitrate issues of
arbitrability . . . Thailand is not entitled to an independent judicial re-determination of that
same question.”)
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See Schneider v. Kingdom of Thailand, 688 F.3d 68, 71 (2d Cir. 2012); Chevron
Corp. v. Republic of Ecuador, 949 F. Supp. 2d 57, 65-67 (D.D.C. 2013).
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RESTATEMENT OF THE L., THE U.S. L. OF INT’L COM. AND INV.-STATE ARB. § 4.12,
reporters’ note e (AM. L. INST., Proposed Final Draft No. 623, 2019) [hereinafter Restatement].
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Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 569 U.S. 564, 569 (2013).
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Supra Section VII.
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Ina C. Popova et al., France, 2020 EUR. ARB. REV. 28, 34.
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X. THE RESTATEMENT AND ACADEMIC COMMENTARY
The delegation question received sustained attention at the time the recently
adopted ALI Restatement of the U.S. Law of International Commercial and
Investor-State Arbitration was prepared. The Reporters, the ALI Council and the
ALI membership at large directly faced the question whether the incorporation of
Kompetenz-Kompetenz language from a set of arbitral rules constituted clear and
unmistakable evidence of an intention to withdraw from courts their authority to
determine arbitrability.
In its lengthy deliberations, the ALI closely examined the proposition that the
presence of Kompetenz-Kompetenz provisions in incorporated institutional rules
satisfies the First Options test. It looked at the proposition from every angle,
carefully weighing both the strengths and weaknesses of the proposition. The
Reporters concluded with confidence that it was unsustainable,70 and their position
was unanimously adopted by both the ALI Council and the ALI membership
when the entire Restatement was approved in May 2019.71
In an unprecedented step in a Restatement, the reporters requested the ALI,
even after the Restatement had received full approval, to be allowed to revisit five
issues that either had been controversial in the discussions, or on which court
decisions contrary to the approved Restatement position had subsequently come
down. Among the five was the delegation issue that is the topic of this article.
The ALI agreed, and reconvened the advisory committee to revisit those matters.
Following discussion, the committee specifically recommended that the
Restatement position on the delegation issue be maintained, and it was. (Notably,
on two of the other four issues that were revisited, the reporters, following
committee deliberation, actually proposed changing the Restatement positions,
and the proposed changes were subsequently approved unanimously by the ALI
70

Restatement, supra note 66, § 2.8, art. b, reporter’s note b(iii).
Brief of Amicus Curiae Professor George A. Bermann in Support of Respondent at
25 fn. 15 and accompanying text, Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer and White Sales, Inc., 576
U.S. ___ (2019) (No. 19-963). (“Petitioner may, as it did previously in its submission
during the certiorari process . . . attempt to undermine the relevance of the ALI
Restatement by suggesting that the final version of the Restatement retreated from a
stronger position on the point taken in an earlier draft. Petitioner observed that the final
draft of the Restatement did not state that it ‘reject[s] the majority line of cases . . . as
based on a misinterpretation of the institutional rules being applied.’ This observation is
disingenuous. First, it is the Comments, not the Reporters’ notes, that state the official
position of the ALI, and Comment b to the relevant section in the draft of the Restatement
as approved states unequivocally that ‘the rules . . . do not expressly give the tribunal
exclusive authority over these issues.’ Restatement, supra note 66, § 2.8, art. B, reporter’s
note b(iii). As for the Reporters’ notes, note b(iii)) examines at length the relevant
language of a large number of institutional rules similar to the AAA’s and observes that
not a single one constitutes ‘clear and unmistakable’ evidence within the meaning of First
Options. There was no need to state a global summary of that finding. As Chief Reporter
of the Restatement, I can affirm that this amicus brief accurately reports the ALI’s
position.”)
71
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Council and the ALI membership.) It is thus noteworthy that the delegation issue
in effect received two "readings" in the ALI and the Restatement position
remained the same.
Commentators similarly recognize the anomaly, in light of what the Court
meant to achieve in First Options, of treating a Kompetenz-Kompetenz provision
in incorporated rules as clear and unmistakable evidence of a delegation:
A [] conclusion from First Options is that absent rebuttal of the
anti-arbitration presumption—and any such rebuttal will surely be
very rare—existence and validity questions will not be subject to
a negative competence-competence doctrine in the United States.
This conclusion is not affected by whether one party has initiated
arbitral proceedings or whether arbitrators have been seized of the
matter. Court jurisdiction to decide arbitrability [prior to
arbitration] will also be full and not limited by a prima facie
standard.72
That author elsewhere described the courts’ position as “startling” and
“misguided.”73 He notes that parties include in their arbitration agreement
institutional rules containing a Kompetenz-Kompetenz clause “almost as a matter
of course.”74 Treating such a clause as barring independent judicial review, he
writes, “seems unwise and unlikely to have been intended by parties when they
opt for institutional arbitration.”75 Significantly, he concludes: “It will fall to the
[Supreme] Court itself to correct this error in a future decision.”76
XI. CONCLUSION
The U.S. courts of appeal have seriously erred in treating the incorporation by
reference in an arbitration agreement of procedural rules containing a KompetenzKompetenz clause as “clear and unmistakable” evidence of an intention to
withdraw from parties the right to a judicial determination of the question whether
they ever validly agreed to arbitrate a given dispute. In order to be clear and
unmistakable, a delegation should be placed directly in the parties’ agreement to
arbitrate, not relegated to a set of procedural rules that few parties will read with
care upon signing the underlying contract.
The courts are also deeply mistaken in assuming that, if arbitrators have
authority to determine the arbitrability of a claim, courts necessarily do not. U.S.
72

John J. Barceló III, Who Decides the Arbitrators’ Jurisdiction? Separability and
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arbitration law distinguishes itself from French arbitration law by, among other
things, embracing “positive,” while rejecting “negative,” Kompetenz-Kompetenz.
That tribunals may determine arbitral jurisdiction does not mean that courts may
not. The meaning of Kompetenz-Kompetenz in U.S. law does not change merely
because rules of arbitral procedure use the term.
Nor is there any indication to the contrary in First Options. U.S. courts,
including the Supreme Court, are well aware of the fact that, KompetenzKompetenz notwithstanding, they have not only the right, but also the obligation,
to determine the arbitrability of a claim if they are asked to do so. Both the FAA
and the New York Convention plainly so state. In demanding clear and
unmistakable evidence of a delegation, the Supreme Court in First Options must
have intended federal courts to take a much closer look at purported delegations
than they have been doing. The Supreme Court’s insistence on clear and
unmistakable evidence was emphatic—so much so that it can fairly be described
as, in and of itself, “clear and unmistakable.”
Kompetenz-Kompetenz provisions are found everywhere on the arbitration
landscape, domestic and international alike. Even if parties do not include the term
directly in their arbitration agreement, virtually all modern arbitration laws and
rules expressly embrace it. If the mere presence of what has become standard
boiler-plate language suffices to establish clear and unmistakable evidence of a
delegation, the presumption that the Supreme Court carefully and determinedly
established in First Options will, for all practical purposes, be reversed.
This makes it all the more important that the very high bar set by the Court for
a valid delegation in First Options be maintained, something the U.S. courts of
appeal have utterly failed to do. Without any serious reasoning whatsoever, they
have taken a position that is inimical to the fundamental principles that (a) parties
are not required to submit their claims to arbitration without their consent and that
(b) they are presumptively entitled, upon request, to an independent judicial
determination of that matter. At stake is something even more basic than the
principle of consent, namely the legitimacy of arbitration itself. It is not news that
arbitration is increasingly under attack.77 U.S. courts should do nothing, in the
supposed interest of being “pro-arbitration,” to place that legitimacy at risk.78 In
insisting that the mere presence of a Kompetenz-Kompetenz provision in
incorporated institutional rules of arbitral procedure by definition meets First
Options’ requirement of clear and unmistakable evidence of a delegation, they
have done just that.

77
See generally, James H. Carter, The Culture of Arbitration and the Defence of
Arbitral Legitimacy, in PRACTISING VIRTUE: INSIDE INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 97, 97
(David D. Caron et al. eds., 2016).
78
See George A. Bermann, What Does It Mean to Be Pro-Arbitration?, 34 ARB.
INT’L 341 (2018).
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POSTSCRIPT
Just when it seemed that the federal courts’ misunderstanding and
misapplication of the Supreme Court’s decision in First Options, Inc. of Chicago v.
Kaplan could not get worse, they have. As the article above demonstrates, the courts
have already done violence to that decision by treating incorporation by reference
in an arbitration agreement of a set of procedural rules authorizing tribunals to
determine their own jurisdiction as “clearly and unmistakably” evidencing the
parties’ intention to deprive courts of primary authority to determine the
arbitrability of a dispute. Kompetenz-Kompetenz in U.S. law does nothing more
than empower tribunals to determine their own jurisdiction. It does not disempower
courts to make that determination, and its meaning does not change merely because
it makes its way into a set of procedural rules. Worse yet, in order to be clear and
unmistakable, a delegation should appear on the face of an arbitration agreement,
not be relegated to a set of procedural rules merely referenced in that agreement and
almost certainly not read when the agreement is made.
In a word, the federal courts have found to be “clear and unmistakable” what is
in fact neither “clear” nor “unmistakable.” A mere reference to KompetenzKompetenz, unaccompanied by any suggestion that the tribunal’s authority thereby
conferred is exclusive, is hardly “clear,” and burying it in a set of procedural rules
that are unlikely to be closely read when an arbitration agreement is signed hardly
makes it “unmistakable.” Moreover, given the presence of Kompetenz-Kompetenz
provisions in all modern rules of arbitral procedure, a delegation will be found in
nearly every case—exactly the result the Supreme Court sought to prevent in First
Options. The federal court rulings have thus deprived the phrase “clear and
unmistakable” of any meaning.
XII. THE SECOND CIRCUIT’S DECISION IN BEIJING SHOUGANG MINING
INVESTMENT CO., LTD. V. MONGOLIA
The court of appeals for the Second Circuit has now delivered a second, and no
less serious, blow to First Options. In its recent decision in Beijing Shougang
Mining Investment Co., Ltd. v. Mongolia,75 Chinese claimants initiated arbitration
against Mongolia under a bilateral investment treaty (BIT) between China and
Mongolia, arguing that Mongolia had expropriated their iron-ore mine in violation
of the BIT. Mongolia challenged arbitral jurisdiction on the ground that, by its
terms, the BIT conferred jurisdiction only over disputes about the quantum of
compensation for expropriation, not over the alleged expropriation itself, an
interpretation of the BIT with which claimants disagreed.76 An arbitral tribunal
seated in New York, agreeing with Mongolia, determined that it lacked jurisdiction
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Beijing Shougang Mining Inv. Co., Ltd. v. Mongolia, No. 19-4191, 2021 U.S. App.
LEXIS 25812 (2d Cir. Aug. 26, 2021).
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Id. at *12-13.

34

THE AMERICAN REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION

[Vol. 32

and accordingly dismissed the claims.77 The claimants thereupon petitioned the
district court to set aside the award and compel a return to arbitration, while
Mongolia cross-petitioned for confirmation of the award.
Claimants argued that the district court, in keeping with First Options, should
review the tribunal’s finding of no jurisdiction de novo, while Mongolia
maintained that the parties had clearly and unmistakably conferred exclusive
authority to determine arbitrability on the tribunal and that a court’s review of the
tribunal’s determination of arbitrability was accordingly subject to deferential
review only.78 The district court conceded that the BIT did not by its terms confer
exclusive authority on the tribunal to determine its own jurisdiction, but found
that the claimants had, by virtue of “[their] behavior during the arbitration,”
provided clear and unmistakable evidence of a delegation, i.e., essentially waived
their right to de novo judicial review.79 It accordingly declined to make an
independent determination of the arbitrability of the dispute and instead,
reviewing the award deferentially, denied claimants’ petition to set aside the
award and granted Mongolia’s cross-petition for confirmation.80
On appeal to the Second Circuit, the claimants disputed the district court’s
finding that the parties had clearly and unmistakably withdrawn from the court its
authority to review independently the tribunal’s determination of arbitrability.
Like the district court, the Second Circuit conceded that the BIT did not itself
clearly and unmistakably confer exclusive authority on the tribunal to determine
the dispute’s arbitrability.81 However, again like the district court, it found clear
and unmistakable evidence of a delegation elsewhere. More specifically, it
concluded that, when the claimants allowed the issue of the arbitrability of their
claims to be determined by the arbitral tribunal, they “clearly and unmistakably”
surrendered what would otherwise have been their right to a de novo
determination of arbitral jurisdiction.82 Specifically, the court observed that the
claimants had agreed with Mongolia to conduct the arbitration in two phases―a
combined jurisdictional and liability phase, followed, if necessary, by a quantum
phase―and that that step constituted a delegation.83 However, there is no reason
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to believe that its decision would have been any different if the jurisdictional and
liability phases had been bifurcated.
XIII. THE SECOND CIRCUIT’S FUNDAMENTAL ERROR
The Second Circuit was wholly unjustified in treating the parties’ submission
of the arbitrability question to the tribunal as clear and unmistakable evidence of a
delegation. It is not in the least remarkable that a party contesting the jurisdiction
of a tribunal would raise its jurisdictional objection to the tribunal itself. That is the
standard course of action.
What, one may ask, did the Second Circuit think the claimants should have done
to avoid conferring exclusive authority on the tribunal over the arbitrability of the
dispute?
Did the Second Circuit think that the claimants should have first instituted an
action in court to compel arbitration, thereby putting the jurisdictional question to a
court before the tribunal had an opportunity to address it? Going immediately to
court is something parties resisting arbitration—typically respondents such as
Mongolia—might do; they have every reason to want the question decided by a
court rather than the tribunal whose jurisdiction they are challenging. But the
claimants in this case were not resisting arbitration; they were seeking arbitration,
and what parties seeking arbitration do is simply initiate arbitration, leaving it to the
respondent, if it wishes to do so, to contest the arbitrability of the dispute before the
tribunal. Indeed, the FAA does not contemplate actions to compel arbitration
against a party, such as Mongolia, that is already appearing in the arbitration, even
if it is doing so only to challenge arbitral jurisdiction.84 In sum, a claimant’s only
recourse, when faced with a challenge to arbitral jurisdiction, is to refute that
challenge before the tribunal. This is precisely what the claimants in this case did.
The simple fact is that the arbitrability question arose before the tribunal, not
because the claimants raised it, but because the respondent did.
Did the court seriously think that the claimants should have left the
jurisdictional challenge by the respondent unanswered? For the claimants to have
done so would all but certainly lead to dismissal of their claim. The court cannot
seriously expect the claimants to have done that either.
In sum, it is absurd to suppose that, by responding to Mongolia’s challenge to
arbitral jurisdiction before the tribunal, claimants clearly and unmistakably
relinquished their First Options right to an independent judicial determination of
arbitrability. Under the logic of the Second Circuit, clear and unmistakable evidence
of a delegation will always be found because claimants, when faced with a
challenge to arbitral jurisdiction addressed to the tribunal, will always follow the
natural and obvious course of action, viz. commence arbitration, and then respond
to any jurisdictional challenge the respondent may choose to bring to the tribunal.
In taking the position it did, the court of appeals both abandoned all logic and
displayed a regrettable lack of understanding of how international arbitration works.
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XIV. THE LEARNING FROM FIRST OPTIONS
By contrast, the Supreme Court in First Options demonstrated that it
understood the premises of arbitration and reasoned logically from them. It should
be noted at the outset that First Options represents a much more common scenario
than does Beijing Shougang. In First Options, as in most cases, the parties seeking
independent post-award review were the respondents, the Kaplans.85 They raised
their jurisdictional objection directly before the tribunal. Upon losing on that
issue, they preserved their objection and proceeded to the merits. Then, having
lost on the merits, they sought vacatur of the resulting award. In doing so, they
asked the reviewing court to make an independent rather than a deferential
determination of the jurisdictional question and to find that they had never agreed
to arbitrate.
The Kaplans were unsuccessful in the district court,86 but the court of appeals
reversed, finding that the Kaplans had in fact never agreed to arbitrate the dispute
and were entitled to have the award vacated as against them (though not as against
MK Investments, which was a signatory to the contract).87 On further appeal, the
Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals’ decision.88 In doing so, the Court,
unlike the Second Circuit in the present case, considered what the Kaplans’
alternatives were and properly assessed them. In his opinion for the Court, Justice
Stephen Breyer rejected the notion, advanced by First Options, that the Kaplans
should have first gone to court for an anti-arbitration injunction targeting the
proceedings in order to preserve their jurisdictional objection to an eventual
award.89
No court has ever held that a party loses its right to contest arbitral jurisdiction
before a tribunal, or to contest a tribunal’s assertion of jurisdiction in post-award
review, by not first seeking an anti-arbitration injunction from a court. Presenting
one’s jurisdictional objections to the tribunal in the first instance is exactly what
the doctrine of Kompetenz-Kompetenz contemplates. It would be wholly inimical
to the efficiency that arbitration is meant to offer to require a party, in order to
mount a challenge to arbitral jurisdiction, to expend the time and resources that
obtaining an anti-arbitration injunction from a court would entail. The court of
appeals is, but should not be, fomenting unnecessary litigation. The Supreme
Court had little difficulty in First Options in concluding that, by bringing their
jurisdictional challenge directly to the tribunal, the respondents had not clearly
and unmistakably evidenced an intention to forego independent judicial review of
the tribunal’s jurisdictional determination.90
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Nor could the Court think that the Kaplans should have refrained from
challenging arbitral jurisdiction before the tribunal, proceeding directly to the
merits instead.91 The Court surely recognized that, had they done so, they would
unquestionably have waived their jurisdictional objection altogether, something
the Court could not possibly ask or expect them to do.92 Nor could the Court
expect the Kaplans to fail to appear in the proceeding at all, for that would have
subjected them to a default award, something they again could not be asked or
expected to do.
The contrast between the Second Circuit’s approach in the present case and
the Supreme Court’s careful one in First Options could hardly be more striking.
The Supreme Court understood what parties in arbitration can and cannot be
expected to do. The Second Circuit did not.
XV. BEIJING SHOUGANG: A CONTRADICTION OF FIRST OPTIONS
But the errors of the Second Circuit in Beijing Shougang are even more
serious than that, for the court ended up taking a position that is squarely contrary
to the decision in First Options itself. As noted above, the Supreme Court flatly
rejected First Options’ contention that, when the Kaplans raised their
jurisdictional objection before the arbitrators, they conferred on the tribunal
exclusive authority to address the objection, and were therefore entitled, at best,
to highly deferential post-award review of the tribunal’s determination.93
Recognizing that consent to arbitrate is absolutely fundamental to the legitimacy
of arbitration, it held that a party does not lose its right of access to a court for an
independent determination of arbitrability unless it “clearly and unmistakably” so
agreed.94 The Court then unanimously ruled that raising a challenge to the
arbitrability of a dispute before the arbitrators falls well short of clear and
unmistakable evidence of an intention to confer on the arbitrators exclusive
authority to make that determination.95 Ironically, it is actually worse to treat the
claimants in Beijing Shougang as having relinquished their right to de novo
review than it would have been to treat the Kaplans in First Options as having
done so. The claimants in Beijing Shougang, unlike the Kaplans, did not question
the tribunal's jurisdiction; they asserted it. It was Mongolia that raised the
question; all the claimants did was reply.
Notably, the district court in First Options had taken exactly the same position
adopted by the Second Circuit in Beijing Shougang. It had held that “any
objection petitioners may have had to the authority of the arbitrators was waived.
. . . [A] party who voluntarily and unreservedly submits an issue to arbitration
cannot later maintain that the arbitrators acted without authority to resolve that
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issue.”96 Of course, the district court misapprehended the Kaplans’ position. They
did not assert that the arbitrators “acted without authority to resolve that issue.”
They acknowledged that the arbitrators had that authority, but maintained that
their decision on the matter was subject to full judicial review in a post-award
action.
But the important point is that in First Options, first the court of appeals for
the Third Circuit, and then the Supreme Court, squarely rejected the district
court’s view. The Third Circuit was emphatic: “A party does not have to try to
enjoin or stay an arbitration proceeding in order to preserve its objection to
jurisdiction.”97 As noted, the Supreme Court affirmed, flatly rejecting the notion
that a party’s submission of a jurisdictional objection to a tribunal could possibly
amount to clear and unmistakable evidence of a delegation and justify denial of
that party’s right, reaffirmed in First Options itself, to independent judicial review
of the tribunal’s jurisdictional determination:
First Options relies on the Kaplans’ filing with the arbitrators a
written memorandum objecting to the arbitrators’ jurisdiction.
But merely arguing the arbitrability issue to an arbitrator does not
indicate a clear willingness to arbitrate that issue, i.e., a
willingness to be effectively bound by the arbitrator’s decision on
that point. To the contrary, insofar as the Kaplans were forcefully
objecting to the arbitrators deciding their dispute with First
Options, one naturally would think that they did not want the
arbitrators to have binding authority over them.
....
We conclude that, because the Kaplans did not clearly agree to
submit the question of arbitrability to arbitration, the court of
appeals was correct in finding that the arbitrability of the
Kaplan/First Options dispute was subject to independent review
by the courts.98
The Supreme Court was of course correct. It simply defies understanding how
submission to a tribunal of a question of arbitrability could be viewed as clearly
and unmistakably amounting to an abandonment of a party’s presumptive right to
independent post-award review of the question. There is obviously nothing in the
least contradictory between a party, on the one hand, addressing the question of
arbitral jurisdiction before a tribunal and, on the other hand, asserting its right to
de novo review of the tribunal’s ruling on that matter in an action to vacate the
resulting award. The Supreme Court plainly appreciated that parties have every
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right to address the question of a dispute’s arbitrability before the tribunal and
thereafter, having lost on that issue, to enjoy independent post-award review of
the matter in an action to vacate the award. In positing that a claimant arguing its
position on arbitrability to the arbitrators amounts to an abandonment of that
party’s right of access to a court for an independent determination of arbitrability,
the Second Circuit obviously missed the entire point that the Supreme Court was
making in First Options.
XVI. THE SECOND CIRCUIT’S MISSTEPS
The Second Circuit judgment in Beijing Shougang is thus deeply disturbing
in multiple respects.
As demonstrated above, the notion that the mere incorporation by reference
in an arbitration agreement of procedural rules containing a KompetenzKompetenz provision constitutes clear and unmistakable evidence of a delegation
is not tenable. To begin with, the Second Circuit perpetuated the fallacy that, if
arbitral tribunals are empowered to determine their own jurisdiction, then courts
are necessarily disempowered to make that judgment. So holding requires
distorting altogether the meaning of Kompetenz-Kompetenz in U.S. law, which
accepts that this doctrine has a positive, but not a negative, dimension. The court
also makes the baseless assumption that parties, upon signing an arbitration
agreement, will examine an instrument captioned “Rules of Procedure” that is
merely incorporated by reference in an arbitration agreement in order to learn
whether and to what extent they have or have not abandoned their right of access
to a court on the question whether they consented to arbitration of their dispute.
And, because Kompetenz-Kompetenz provisions are ubiquitous in contemporary
arbitration, the net effect of this jurisprudence is to undo the presumptive right of
parties to the independent judicial determination of arbitrability that the Supreme
Court took pains to reaffirm in First Options.
Second, the court treats a party’s taking the most prudent course of action
possible, whether in asserting arbitral jurisdiction (as in Beijing Shougang) or in
challenging it (as in First Options), viz., arguing one’s position on arbitrability to
the arbitrators themselves, as if it were an abandonment of that party’s right of
access to a court for an independent determination of arbitrability. This flies in
the face of logic and experience.
Third, and perhaps most alarming, the court predicated its finding of clear and
unmistakable evidence of a delegation on precisely the same conduct that the
Supreme Court in First Options had expressly rejected as a basis for finding clear
and unmistakable evidence of a delegation. Thus, in purporting to implement the
Supreme Court’s position in First Options, the Second Circuit actually defied it.
XVII. CONCLUSION: THE EVISCERATION OF FIRST OPTIONS
Due to the position that the federal courts, including most recently the Second
Circuit in Beijing Shougang, are taking in their application of First Options, the
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Supreme Court’s promise of a presumptive right to an independent judicial
determination of arbitrability has now, for all practical purposes, been eviscerated.
First, we have been told by the federal appellate courts that the ever-present
appearance of a Kompetenz-Kompetenz clause in incorporated rules of arbitral
procedure is sufficient to signify clear and unmistakable evidence of a delegation.
Now, we are being told by the Second Circuit that replying to a respondent’s
challenge to arbitral jurisdiction before the arbitrators—a step that any party
pursuing a claim in arbitration has no choice but to make—is also clear and
unmistakable evidence of a delegation. The result is that, on either or both of these
fallacious bases, virtually every court going forward will find that a party has
relinquished its presumptive First Options right to a court’s independent
assessment of arbitral jurisdiction, whether at the pre-arbitration or the postaward stage. If this jurisprudence is maintained, that right will, for all practical
purposes, have ceased to exist.

